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The Constitution, The Uniqueness




There is a theory of politics - or of history - or perhaps it
should be classified as a sober fable - that might be called the The-
ory of Democratic Prosperity, for it holds that democratic stability is
possible only in the presence of general economic prosperity. The
Theory is an old one - the works of the post-Enlightenment think-
ers and some of their predecessors are full of it - but it is repeat-
edly rediscovered, probably because it speaks with such clarity. The
less the wealth enjoyed by the people of a nation, the greater the
difficulties they will encounter in establishing counterweights to
governmental power. If a nation's people are impoverished com-
pared to the people who live elsewhere on the globe, then democ-
racy will lead to impossible demands for wealth and what wealth
buys: consumer products, real property, access, class. An authorita-
rian government might ignore the pleas of its impoverished masses,
but in an age when a burgeoning technology of rapid mass commu-
nication has made the world a village, the people of any new democ-
racy will lay claim to their "fair share" of goods and resources as a
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means of keeping up with theJoneses, who, although they may live
half a world away and speak another tongue, remain electronic
neighbors.
The Theory of Democratic Prosperity makes no claim that general
prosperity is a sufficient condition for the development of a democ-
racy, but the Theory does insist that democratic government in the
absence of prosperity is inherently unstable. The prosperity must
be general, according to the Theory, because if it is not, then the
democracy becomes a battle in which the have-nots demand what
the haves will not grant. Thus democracy is rooted in a large middle
class, a class defined less by its income or property holdings than by
its subjective understanding that its own stake is in the status quo, a
class that will serve as a conservative bulwark against demands for
change so drastic that the ruling elite is bound to resist them. The
significant datum is not whether prosperity really is general or not,
but whether this middle class believes that it is. When this middle
class, or gradualist class, exists, change is likely to come slowly;
when it does not, the likely result of a popular or representative de-
mocracy on the Western model is a hardening of positions at the
extremes, the destruction of what center there might be, and either
chaos or authoritarianism. Gradual change does not, on this view,
create or require a permanent underclass. On the contrary, the less
radical the government's interventions, so the Theory teaches, the
greater the potential for sustained economic growth, growth with
potential to improve the material conditions of all members of the
society. The cycle is a neat one: Prosperity requires gradualism;
gradualism requires patience; patience requires prosperity. In this
sense, the prosperity that is the end of political society must also be
present at its beginning.
The Theory also requires prosperity for another reason: Societies
with strong, expanding, diverse economies provide more than one
route to prestige, influence, and the accumulation of wealth. Socie-
ties with economies that are relatively weak often provide only one
- government. As Seymour Martin Lipset has put the matter:
If there is enough wealth in the country so that it does not make
too much difference whether some redistribution takes place, it is
easier to accept the idea that it does not matter greatly which side
is in power. But if loss of office means serious losses for major
power groups, they will seek to retain or secure office by any
means available.'
If running the government for the benefit of one's self and one's
cronies is the only way to get ahead, a rational governor will be re-
luctant to yield office, and will, while there, pervert public trust for
1. S. LxPsEr, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITCS 51 (rev. ed. 1981).
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private gain. Many a state of emergency and suspension of the
forms of democratic process, the Theory teaches, has been imposed
because there is no path to power once out of government. This
Theory of Democratic Prosperity, propounded in one form or an-
other by theorists as diverse as Lipset, Joseph Schumpeter, Milton
Friedman, Charles Lindblom, Friedrich Hayek, and even (arguably)
Karl Marx, uses the term "democracy" consistently with the image it
conjures for most of the Western world: Pluralistic politics in which
interest groups and parties compete with one another, electoral rep-
resentation with a relatively widespread suffrage, free and open crit-
icism of the policies of the governing party, and - what is too often
taken for granted in the West - governors who leave office when
their terms expire. The Theory specifically excludes the possibility
that democracy itself might be measured by (rather than enabled by)
the breadth of the distribution of resources or the standard of living.
It would be a mistake, however, to think of the Theory as some-
thing of recent origin. The post-Enlightenment philosophers of
eighteenth century Europe pressed the point that economic growth
and perceived economic fairness were necessary for good govern-
ment.2 On this view, a dynamic economy might create between the
weak and the powerful a commonality of interest adequate to
dampen rivalries that would otherwise arise.3 Nor was this position
limited to the democratic philosophers. As C.B. Macpherson has
noted, even Thomas Hobbes, obviously no democrat, urged upon
the sovereign policies that would promote the prosperity of the
broad mass of individuals. 4
Concluding that general prosperity is necessary for good govern-
ment is of course not the same as concluding that it is necessary for
democratic government, but the jump is not a very long one, and in
the twentieth century observers have taken it. The modem theo-
rists, moreover, have a view as well on the source of the prosperity so
necessary to democracy: the market. Thus two of the most promi-
nent exponents of the Theory of Democratic Prosperity, Milton
Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, agree, in Friedman's words, "that
capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom." 5 Charles
Lindblom, although more observer than advocate, has made the
same point: "The liberal notion of freedom was freedom from gov-
ernment's many interventions, and for that kind of freedom markets
are indeed indispensable."' 6 Moreover, says Lindblom, polyarchy -
rule by the many - would be unimaginable in the absence of a
2. See A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS
FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977).
3. See id. at 52 ("Thus it was expected that expansion of domestic trade would cre-
ate more cohesive communities while foreign trade would help avoid wars between
them").
4. See C.B. Macpherson, Hobbes's Political Economy, in THE RISE AND FALL OF Eco-
NOMICJUSTICE AND OTHER ESSAYS 133 (1987).
5. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 10 (1982); see also F. HAYEK, THE ROAD
TO SERFDOM 69-70 (1944).
6. C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYS-
TEMS 164 (1977).
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market.7
Trades in a free market tend to increase net societal wealth, and
Friedman, at least, argues that people free to choose their economic
system will prefer the market, because the market, he says, will bring
about an "enormous increase in the well-being of the masses," as it
did in nineteenth century Europe.8 He does not argue explicitly
that governments whose people are happy are more likely to sur-
vive, but that point should go as given. The burden of his view is
that an improvement in the condition of the masses is a good thing
and lends stability to the government, points difficult to deny, and
that governments restrictive of economic freedom tend to have less
economic growth, and conditions for the masses that are therefore
worse. If the conditions of the masses are worse, the masses (who,
free to choose, would want free markets) will seek a change. The
government is then required for its own survival to place more re-
strictions on the freedom of its people, lest they advocate - or cre-
ate - situations that would lead to the system's destruction.9
Joseph Schumpeter ended up in nearly the same place but trav-
eled quite a different road to get there. Schumpeter, making his
case for the inevitable failure of capitalism, conceded that the argu-
ment on behalf of socialism could never be made in purely eco-
nomic terms - at least not in the United States - because "short of
atrocious mismanagement, the huge mass of available commodities
and services ... promises a level of satisfaction of economic needs
even of the poorest members of society ... that would eliminate
anything that could possibly be described as suffering or want."' 0
On this point, Lipset has noted that widely shared prosperity
"means that there is relatively little difference between the stan-
dards of living of adjacent social classes," and that classes somewhat
further apart might also register "nearly similar consumption pat-
terns.""I Thus, "the wealthier a country, the less is status inferiority
experienced as a major source of deprivation."' 2 Whether in
Schumpeter's formulation or Lipset's, this is precisely the result that
the Theory of Democratic Prosperity requires: If powerful elites are
to respect the democracy, the less powerful must see the economy
as working for their benefit.
That this vision of the preconditions of democracy has weaknesses
should be evident. As a positive theory of government, for example,
the Theory has explanatory power only when many other assump-
7. See'id. at 165.
8. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 10.
9. See id. at 15-19.
10. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 384 (3d ed. 1950).
II. S. LPSET, supra note 1, at 50.
12. Id.
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tions are added to the model. The success of democracy in, say,
Botswana and Costa Rica, and its flourishing amid the post-war dev-
astation ofJapan and West Germany, cannot be linked to the wide-
spread prosperity and sustained growth that the Theory requires.
Further difficulties arise when the Theory is put to prescriptive use,
especially when taken as the major premise of a syllogism conclud-
ing that the United States suffers from a chauvinistic myopia in
thinking that it can force changes in the systems by which most na-
tions are ruled, without first strengthening their economies. De-
spite these problems, the Theory yields interesting results when the
United States rather than another nation is taken as its subject. The
Theory, in fact, may be quite useful in trying to solve the Unique-
ness Puzzle - the puzzle, that is, of why the American experiment
in constitutional government has succeeded so well for so long,
when so many other efforts at establishing democratic republics
have failed so miserably.
The Theory of Democratic Prosperity explains the success of con-
stitutional government in the United States by pointing to the
growth over time of the economy, the generally improving standard
of living, the existence of independent economic power as a coun-
terweight to government, and the continued flourishing of the mid-
dle class. The Theory's gentle irony is that it is capable of extolling
precisely those aspects of the American Constitution that Charles
Beard once wrote to condemn.13 The anti-majoritarian protections
of property, for example, become not the safeguards of the proper-
tied classes, but rather the preservatives of democracy itself; by lim-
iting the scope of societal changes that the masses can demand, the
Constitution lessens the likelihood that those with the greatest pri-
vate power will dismantle the democratic institutions. The Theory
is also able to justify the exclusion of slaves and, to a large extent,
the poor from suffrage for the first century of the nation's existence.
Before the massive economic expansion of the past century, there
simply was not enough wealth to share with all these potential
voters.
The First Amendment fits neatly into the Theory of Democratic
Prosperity. The Theory describes democracy as including freedom
of advocacy, but the Theory also acknowledges what courts hearing
First Amendment cases too often seem to ignore: Expressing one's
views costs money. The Theory's dismissal of the possibility of de-
mocracy under socialism, in fact, rests importantly on this point.
Thus Milton Friedman has argued that the difficulty of amassing pri-
vate capital in a socialist economy - to say nothing of the problem
of finding a place to spend it if the government owns the printing
presses - suggests that under socialism, the government could not
effectively guarantee the freedom of advocacy so central to Western-
style pluralist democracy. 14 This argument, in turn, can help ex-
13. See C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONsTrrUTmON OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1935).
14. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 16-18.
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plain a line of Supreme Court decisions that some have criticized as
granting freedom of speech in proportion to wealth.15 It is after all
the ability to raise funds that will lead to the creation of stable
counterweights to governmental action.
Constitutional restrictions on the ability of the majority to strip
the powerful of their resources (including speech resources) are
hardly evidence that the document is undemocratic. Plainly they are
evidence, were any needed, that the original Constitution has noth-
ing to do with direct democracy, in which every member of the demos
has an equal say on every issue that arises. Representation, not di-
rect voice, is the Constitution's critical feature, and representation is
by its nature a relatively inefficient means for aggregating voter
preferences. The Constitution prescribes republican government, a
representative democracy in which the electoral process is complex
and the legislative process is cumbersome. That this combination
works to slow change is axiomatic; but this systemic inertia appears
to some to be anachronistic, not well-suited to solving the problems
of a modern industrial power.
The inability of the legislature to promulgate swift and radical
changes in society, however, has not evidently led to a collapse of
the American system, nor yet the disintegration of the nation's lead-
ing position in the world. Possibly the contrary is true: Perhaps the
system has survived so well precisely because the Constitution
makes legislative victories relatively expensive to achieve. Public
choice theorists are fond of pointing to the disproportionate influ-
ence that well-organized interests can bring to bear on legislative
processes, but the Theory of Democratic Prosperity might count this
a benefit rather than a cost of representative government. Were
these "special interests" less well represented, they might challenge
the forms of democracy in ways more threatening to the democratic
ideal.
Of course, setting out to make the legislative process a cumber-
some one in order to protect the democracy against radical legisla-
tive initiatives might amount to constitutional overkill. The Theory
of Democratic Prosperity predicts restrictions on what changes can
be worked by popular will, but the prediction is independent of
legal barriers. According to the Theory, the democracy will remain
stable only if the middle class forms a stable democratic center, re-
15. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (restricting the ability of govern-
ment to limit "independent" expenditures in political campaigns); First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (restricting the ability of government to limit
corporate speech).
The criticism tends toward the polemical. See, e.g., Wright, Money and the Pollution of
Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 609
(1982); Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YAtL L.J. 581
(1984).
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sistant to demands from the political extremes. Without this middle
class, popular revolution or elite reaction can eventually sweep away
the forms of democracy. Thus the success of the American constitu-
tional experiment, in this vision, rests less on particular legal restric-
tions on majority action than it does on a sustained and broad-based
economic growth which teaches the middle class that radical change
is not in its interest.
II.
The provisions of the 1787 Constitution, together with the Bill of
Rights, suggest a government designed (whether consciously or
not) to put into practice the Theory of Democratic Prosperity. This
perspective might be useful in framing a small corner of the debate
over the proper scope of judicial review. One of the trickier tasks
for scholars who are enamored of the Supreme Court's transparent
efforts to use the Constitution to protect those privacy and associa-
tional rights that a majority of its members consider morally impera-
tive is to distinguish the interpretive method of such decisions as
Griswold v. Connecticut 16 and Roe v. Wade 17 from that of Lochner v. New
York.18 One possible distinction is of course the too-easy dodge that
the Justices who decided Lochner, in rejecting a legislative effort to
regulate the hours that bakery employees could be required to work,
simply employed the wrong moral theory, whereas the right to per-
sonal privacy protected in Griswold and Roe employed the right one.
An aesthetically more appealing approach is to seek to harmonize
the cases rather than to distinguish them - to try, for example, to
use changes in social mores to justify shifts in judicial sentiment.
Perhaps the Lochner Court sensed something important about the
first part of the twentieth century, just as the Griswold and Roe
Courts might have sensed something about the last.' 9
The Theory of Democratic Prosperity does little to help those
seeking to justify the method of Griswold and Roe, but it does supply
a name to what the Lochner Court might have sought and missed,
and what today's Supreme Court would easily find: prosperity. One
could perhaps build a theory of judicial review on a search for the
economic conditions of democracy, concluding that the more they
are present, the greater the leeway the majority should have in re-
stricting the owners of private capital. If the economic conditions
demanded by the Theory exist, then the gradualist middle class will
prevent restrictions so severe that they would likely lead to anti-
democratic reaction. Consequently, any particular legislative initia-
tive is unlikely to lead to an anti-capitalist onslaught. When the
middle class is smaller, the economy weaker, the Justices have
greater reason for vigilance, because there is no popular bulwark
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. Cf Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013
(1984) (explaining how Lochner could be right then and wrong now).
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against democratic excess of the kind that could end the constitu-
tional experiment.
What would matter, then, in a discussion over whether Lochner
was rightly decided would be a partly empirical, partly instinctual
determination on whether, at the time the case was decided, the eco-
nomic conditions of democracy were sufficiently present to protect
the democracy even if a popular majority were permitted in a partic-
ular case to impose its will on private capital owned by a minority.
The Supreme Court in 1905 might rationally have concluded that
the nation was sufficiently poor that democracy would survive only if
the owners of private capital were protected, just as the Court could
have concluded three decades later (and might conclude today) that
prosperity is sufficiently widespread and entrenched that democracy
would survive restrictions on the economically powerful.
Without endorsing ajudicial review based on the Theory of Dem-
ocratic Prosperity, it is a matter of more than passing interest to try
to work out what its method might entail. A constitutional court
working from the Theory would have to test legislative initiatives
not against abstract rules drawn from the Constitution's text, or at
least not against those rules alone, but also against its reading of the
concrete economic conditions prevailing in the United States. The
greater the concentration of private wealth, and the greater the per-
ception of a desperate, unfair poverty, the more vigilant the court
would be against government moves that might spark a battle that
could end democracy. So for example a court before the Civil War
would be sensitive to anything approaching a move toward freeing
the slaves. Of course the Congress could not cause Dred Scott to be
set free from his master;20 if these people could escape and later
become of all things potential voters, think of the violence that
would result as the South, and perhaps the North as well, resisted
their demands. Even the violence that in fact did result from the
struggle over the slave system might not have changed this percep-
tion. Such seemingly odious decisions as The Civil Rights Cases21 and
Plessy v. Ferguson22 could be explained, at least in part, as judicial
resistance to demands for the kind of equality that would, in the very
explicit fears of some, bring to a crashing end what fragile forms of
democracy existed in the post-war South.23
A court that viewed its mission this way would be engaged in a
pragmatic enterprise, one in which the highest value is the preserva-
20. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
21. 100 U.S. 3 (1883).
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. Cf. G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND (1971) (discussing
link between Southern fears about former slaves and Southern views on racial inferi-
ority); C.V. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974) (explain-
ing fears that led to widespread implementation of segregation in the post-war South).
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tion of the institutions of constitutional government. True, the
Constitution - primarily through its amendments - protects indi-
vidual rights against that same government, but the Theory of Dem-
ocratic Prosperity is concerned with the basics, and the basics were
mostly settled in 1787. Thus the judge who approved the wide-
spread oppression of black people, whether before the Civil War or
after it, could explain herself not as subjugating her personal prefer-
ences to her reading of the constitutional document, but as subju-
gating both to the overarching need to protect the democratic
enterprise itself against majoritarian demands that could destroy
it. 24
Richard Posner, in The Economics of Justice,25 has proposed some-
thing very close to this, although perhaps without realizing it. In his
vision, judges ought to be guided by a morality based on choosing
the course most likely to maximize societal wealth. The sensible
next step in his theory - a step that he apparently did not consider
- would be the corollary that changing economic conditions might
dictate shifting emphases. The rule that maximizes wealth might be
very different in the antebellum South than in the post-industrial
North, and very different in the era of Lochner than in the era of
activist administrative government.
Accepting that corollary would, in a sense, read the Theory of
Democratic Prosperity into the Constitution, but it would also do
something else: It would constitute explicit acknowledgment of
what Karl Marx insisted was always true - that law is simply a part
of the superstructure, determined by the material conditions of
work, that is, by the relationship between the laborer and the means
of production. In a system in which the means of production are
privately owned, the law will in the end reflect the interests of the
owners. This is the world that Marx claimed would lead to revolu-
tion. It is also, apparently, the world of the Theory of Democratic
Prosperity, and the world that Professor - now Judge - Posner
would prefer to inhabit. His preference is based, of course, on the
faith that Marx was wrong about the implications of his own deter-
minism, the faith that legal protection of the interests of the owners
of capital will lead not to oppression but to prosperity, and the faith
that general prosperity, in turn, will reinforce, not weaken, the de-
mocracy. One may at once concede the sincerity of that faith while
wondering at the chain of assumptions masked by its logical cast.
Ill.
The Theory of Democratic Prosperity is a theory about necessary
conditions, not sufficient ones. The Theory permits prosperous
countries that are not Western-style democracies; the self-styled
24. For a scathing and closely reasoned critique of the tendency of anti-slavery
judges to subjugate their personal preferences to purportedly higher political values in
the escaped slave cases, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS (1975).
25. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE (1981).
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"democracy" in prosperous South Korea is a prominent example.
What the Theory denies is the possibility that democracy on the
Western model might flourish in a country that is poor.
In the 1980s, this is a distinction that matters, for the 1980s have
been the era of the Reagan Doctrine in foreign affairs. The Reagan
Doctrine has two principal components: first, a commitment by the
United States to support anti-communist insurgencies in nations on
the fringe of the Soviet Empire, and second, an undertaking to seek
out and support democratic, centrist "third forces" in nations in
which right-wing, pro-United States dictatorships are resisted by in-
surgent forces believed to lean toward the Soviet Union. Both com-
ponents are justified by the Reagan Administration as involving the
promotion of democracy abroad. The deeply divisive anti-commu-
nist aspect of the Reagan Doctrine has involved material support for
violent resistance movements in four countries: Afghanistan, An-
gola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. In none of the four nations is
there a serious pretense that the resistance movement can over-
throw the constituted government; but in each case, the Administra-
tion expresses the hope that its policy will harass the government
into agreeing to democratic reforms. The less controversial third-
force aspect has been showcased in Haiti, which at this writing still
awaits its democratic moment, and the Philippines, where the mo-
ment has come but the democracy remains shaky. The morality of
the Reagan Doctrine is simple. Its political science is only slightly
more complex.
The moral understanding underlying the Doctrine holds that
Western-style electoral democracy is the best available approxima-
tion of rule by the people, which is morally better than governance
in its other common forms - rule by the privileged, rule by the
powerful, rule by the party. Pluralist electoral democracy is said to
free the human potential and transform the human spirit, whereas
systems of government antithetical to Western democratic values
are said to be inherently oppressive of both. The better human con-
dition is freedom, but the usual human condition is bondage. Free-
dom, on this theory, is a fragile flower, blooming only for this brief
season of history, and only over the minor part of the globe. If the
flower is to live, if it is to blossom elsewhere, it will be only because
of the concrete efforts of dedicated people; unless the United States,
the most powerful nation in the free world, acts to nurture democ-
racy wherever it might spring up, the fragile flower will finally die,
and humanity will revert to its usual condition of bondage.
The political science of the. Reagan Doctrine sees the United
States and the Soviet Union as superpower rivals, nations that would
compete for world dominance no matter what their respective polit-
ical and economic systems. It is on this view an accident of history
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that one superpower is capitalist and democratic, the other socialist
and totalitarian, but it is an accident with important implications for
American foreign policy. The reason to support truly democratic
movements abroad - violent and non-violent movements alike - is
that it happens to be the case that democratic governments tend to
be allies of the United States, whereas non-democratic governments
tend toward anti-Americanism. Communist governments tend to
ally with the other superpower, and once in place are not easily nud-
ged toward a Western-style democracy that might better suit Ameri-
can interests. Anti-communism is simply the promotion of national
interest. Thus the moral status of democracy is not in issue; its
political status, or more properly, its geopolitical status, is what
matters.
The Reagan Doctrine is as hotly debated as foreign policies ever
are, but it may simply be old wine in a new bottle. For decades, the
United States has been urging the rest of the world to imitate its
successful democracy, and much of the world has tried, often with-
out lasting success, especially in countries that are poor.28 The
United States has also tried to bring democracy to other countries
directly, through negotiation, through diplomatic pressure, through
covert paramilitary activities, and through direct military interven-
tion. Curiously, direct military intervention - everyone's last
choice - has had the most notable record of successes, in Japan and
Germany certainly, long ago (briefly) in Guatemala, and more re-
cently, so some say, in Grenada. Elsewhere, the efforts have gener-
ally failed. The Theory of Democratic Prosperity would predict this
failure, and would suggest that rather than writing fancy constitu-
tional documents emulating the American model, nations desiring
to develop Western-style democracy should first open up their
economies.
This seems a perfectly reasonable conclusion as a matter of polit-
ical economy, but it ought to be a little bit shocking and a little bit
tragic to those who believe in the rule of law, or rather, those who
believe in the possibility that law can rule. It should be shattering
only to the few remaining scholars who insist that law is a discipline
characterized by a spectacular neutrality entirely autonomous from
normal political, social, and economic discourse.
Paul Brest wrote of the legal community a few years ago that
"[miuch of our commitment to the rule of law really seems a com-
mitment to the rule of our law." 27 No doubt he intended this as a
scathing indictment, but it isn't really, not to the exponent of the
Theory of Democratic Prosperity. For under that Theory, it is not in
the end the rule of law (in the sense of the act that the law com-
26. The Reagan Doctrine may also be seen as a return to the status quo - promo-
tion by the United States of the forms of democracy abroad - if the Carter Administra-
tion's emphasis on human rights in the sense of personal integrity is considered a
historical aberration. See J. MURAVCHIK, THE UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JIMMY CARTER AND
THE DILEMMAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (1986). My use of the word "aberration" does
not imply any value judgment.
27. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 772 (1982).
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mands or forbids) that matters. Laws are there, and they are fol-
lowed or broken, but the output of the legal system is a
consequence of the economic organization of the society. If "the
law" is "our law," the reason must be that "we" are the elite without
whose consent no one could govern. If the law tends toward injus-
tice for the great mass of people, then it must be because "we" are
imposing it on "them," a result that the forms of democracy make
unlikely. The Theory of Democratic Prosperity holds it more likely
that "we," if "we" didn't like what "they" were doing, would elimi-
nate the forms of democracy altogether. But if on th other hand
the law tends toward justice for the great mass of people, then the
great mass of people must perceive themselves to be within the rul-
ing elite - precisely what the Theory would predict, and what the
first three words of the Constitution of the United States insist.
That perception, however, is the distinctive characteristic of the
American demos, and does not obtain in most of the nations now
struggling toward or against Western-style pluralist democracy.
Anyone can write a constitution beginning "We, the People," but
the Uniqueness Puzzle asks why the American Constitution is the
most successful effort. The Theory of Democratic Prosperity
teaches that only a nation in which the people are already economi-
cally autonomous and individually prosperous can place any force
behind the words. Thus the United States can no more export its
Constitution than it can export the summer sky of the New England
shore - or than the Sandinistas can export revolution. According
to the Theory, democracy - and presumably revolution as well -
can take root only in soil already nurtured by specific material eco-
nomic conditions. 28 In this sense, the critics have a point: The Rea-
gan Doctrine is myopic and it is naive, as are all American policies
intended to promote pluralist democracy in hations that are poor.
The Theory of Democratic Prosperity says that it is .not the Consti-
tution that is foundational, but the material conditions within which
the government is called upon to make it work. Thus it is the Amer-
ican economy, not the American Constitution, that nations strug-
gling toward democracy should be encouraged to emulate. This
conclusion, however, runs afoul of a troubling possibility: Very
likely, American economic history is impossible to emulate.
Still, for those who consider democracy morally superior to the
other possibilities, and for those who consider it the American mis-
28. The conclusion that democracy or revolution can take root only in properly nur-
tured soil does not suggest that the effort to plant either one in unfertile ground is
without political significance. Thus whatever degree of illogic may attend the insistence
that the Nicaraguan resistance - the "contras" - be supported notwithstanding the
unlikelihood of internal rebellion also attaches to the frequent effort to defend the pop-
ular Latin American leftist slogan "Revolution without Borders" on the ground that
revolution only takes place in concrete material conditions.
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sion, whether for reasons of transcendent morality or for reasons of
political expediency, to bring democracy to the world, there is a
slender reed of hope in this materialist deluge. Perhaps the Theory
of Democratic Prosperity is false. There are counter-examples to its
teachings. There are logical holes. There is circularity.
The conclusion that the Theory is false, however, leads the argu-
ment into fresh and troubling turnings. If the Theory is false, for
example, then Charles Beard's thesis might be the true one; perhaps
the Constitution was written by a self-interested clique to protect its
own wealth, in which case it is not clear what principle of justice
gives it binding force. If the Theory is false, moreover, the solution
to the Uniqueness Puzzle must lie in another direction. Perhaps
Protestant sectarianism, for example, or the historical existence of
the frontier might be cited to explain the success of American de-
mocracy. But religion is declining as a force in the lives of most
Americans, and the frontier has disappeared, so these explanations
for the Uniqueness Puzzle might also suggest that democracy is near
to running its course.
So if the Theory is true, democracy is often limited by the degree
of its depredations upon the owners of private capital, and in the
economic world of the late twentieth century, may never take firm
root where it does not already exist. And if the Theory is false, de-
mocracy under the American Constitution may be an idea whose
time is passing. Both are depressing conclusions, and uncomforta-
ble ones on which to reflect. A brighter world might be one in
which values could be divorced from material conditions, because in
that world one might venture that the spirit of the American demos is
itself unique in ways specially conducive to the survival of demo-
cratic institutions. In this brighter world, the democratic spirit
might even be exported, or discovered elsewhere, because the val-
ues making democracy possible and successful might prove not
linked to economic conditions; they might instead bear some more
profound relationship to a transcendent and non-materialistic
human condition. A pleasant fantasy, that one, but a hypothesis
which is finally testable not in the laboratory of logic but in the
chapel of faith.
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